Several models of public private partnerships have emerged focusing on wealth creation from high value resources, risk distribution through cost and benefit sharing, and prevention of loss of biodiversity through collaboration among members of the public and private sectors and local communities. However, there remain many information gaps underlying their social-ecological system performance. A case study of Liuwa Plain National Park (3,660 km 2 ), western Zambia, to demonstrate the relationship between social capital and operational management by multiple partners between 2004 and 2011 was carried out. Literature review, expert knowledge and interviews of 57 informants with historical perspectives of the area were employed. We determined that social-economic-ecological gains and benefit distribution were influenced by the capacity of partners to negotiate collective interests. Intra and inter-partnership networking, social learning and differential capacity were also important factors.
INTRODUCTION
The continued loss of biodiversity in most African countries has triggered policy attempts to experiment with various forms of partnerships in state owned protected areas (Fearnhead, 2009; Leverington et al., 2010; Lockwood, 2010) . Though there has been proliferation of partnerships in Africa in the last few decades, literature on public private partnerships (PPPs) in protected areas remained limited (Farlam, 2005) . Experiments with partnerships for protected area management are usually conducted in tandem with initiatives that seek to address park-neighbour conflicts and natural resources privatisation (Abbot et al., 2000; Barrow et al., 2000; Jones & Murphree, 2001; Fearnhead, 2009) . Partly driven by the notion of 'sustainable' institutions (Arrow et al., 1995) , the main objective of these partnerships has been to manage the carrying capacity and social-ecological resilience of protected areas (Dearden & Bennett, 2005) . This involves collaborative and legally binding relationships based on shared responsibilities, resources, risks and benefits associated with protected area management within a defined period of time (Phillips, 2003) . This objective was stressed at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa where civil societies and local communities were also explicitly recognised as being vital elements of traditional partnerships. The notion of partnerships has also been advanced through other international instruments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and particularly CBD Aichi targets that provide a platform for effective conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing of benefits from natural resources (CBD, 1992 and ). In addition, community based natural resource management (CBNRM) fosters mutually beneficial partnerships, and collective management of natural resources by the state, local communities and other stakeholders (Suich et al., 2009) .
The introduction of the theme of benefit sharing in discussions around partnerships has led to research efforts aimed at exploring ways to promote and assess progress towards effective benefit sharing (Farley & Costanza, 2010; Howard, 2010; Nkhata et al., 2012) , particularly in state owned protected areas. These efforts have incorporated analyses of broader aspects of benefit 10.2305/IUCN.CH.2013.PARKS-19-1.VRN.en sharing initiatives such as social and human development goals, recognition of social justice and the uniqueness of each country's indigenous culture, and acknowledgment of the limits imposed by natural resource management (Gruber, 2010) . These research efforts have further reflected growing recognition that benefit sharing initiatives cannot be successful in the absence of well-functioning governmental organisations, local community institutions and free-market mechanisms (Schuklenk & Kleinsmidt, 2006; Wunder, 2007) . Given the implications of diverse entities working together to accomplish common objectives and produce greater public value (Turton, 2008) , such research efforts have been identified as belonging to a new area of inquiry focusing on the theme of collaborative governance (Brower et al., 2010) . Although a significant amount of literature on the topic of collaborative governance does exist, there is still much to be learned from studying a diverse array of these systems to better understand how they function and what it takes for them to be successful (Pomeroy et al., 2010; Lockwood, 2010) .
In this paper, we use the theory of collaborative governance to analyse the partnerships arrangements behind a benefit sharing scheme in Liuwa Plain National Park (LPNP) in Zambia. The case study provides useful information about how collaborative governance systems are designed and managed so as to function effectively in the context of benefit sharing. It presents an instructive example of the complexities of collaborative governance. The core objective of the partnership in LPNP had a public-oriented focus, while the benefit sharing programme was fundamentally a private sector initiative. Although both the public sector and local community actors actively participated in the partnership, questions still remain whether the private sector actor adopted a more competitive or collaborative approach in the benefit sharing programme. We argue that a collaborative governance perspective illustrates how, through the use of cross-sectoral partnerships, the level of stakeholder participation in benefit sharing schemes can be either enhanced or diminished. Therefore, the questions we consider in this paper are: How does collaborative governance enhance partnership performance of a state owned protected area such as LPNP? What is the role of partnership process in fostering implementation of the partnership? Are power relations and benefit sharing between parties important factors in a partnership for protected area management? We hypothesise that benefit sharing among the stakeholders influences performance of parts of the socio -ecological system in the LPNP.
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE FOR EXPLORING PARTNERSHIPS FOR BENEFIT SHARING
It is important to acknowledge that the term collaborative governance means different things to different people (Paavola et al., 2009 ). In the environmental sector, the term only emerged in the recent years in response to perceived failures in policy making and implementation (Phillips, 2003; Lockwood, 2010) . The limitations of conventional command and control approaches to environmental problems played a critical role in the emergence of the term. We begin by breaking down the term into the two concepts on which it is based: collaboration and governance (Armitage et al., 2008) .
Collaboration is essentially a social process that involves different actors working together to create more benefits than could be produced in unilateral settings (Hall, 1995; Imperial & Kauneckis, 2003; Imperial, 2005) . This process is founded on social relationships in which different actors influence each others' behaviour to promote common interests. The advantages of collaboration include reduced transactional costs, greater social-ecological resilience, and enhanced performance. Most researchers do not view collaboration as a 'fix-all' strategy for all social problems. As such, its significance is usually contingent upon a range of contextual, preferential and contingency factors (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Imperial, 2005) .
Governance is usually defined as 'the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken on issues of public concern, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say' (Graham et al., 2003) . Essentially, governance processes reveal the interactions amongst social actors, of which government is just a part (Olsson et al., 2004; Imperial & Kauneckis, 2003) . This process can be institutionalised at different levels of human interaction as a means of social coordination that engenders ordered rule, collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Stoker, 1998) , and allows members of society to share power and make decisions (Berkes, 2009; Plummer & Armitage, 2007) .
From the above, collaborative governance can be conceived as societal arrangements where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented and deliberative and which aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programmes or assets (Armitage & Plummer, 2010) .
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LIUWA PLAIN NATIONAL PARK: BIODIVERSITY, HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT LPNP (3,660 km 2 ) is one of the 20 National Parks in Zambia. It is managed under Wildlife Act. No. 12 of 1998 by the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). It is located in the western part of Zambia at 14°13'-14°51'S and 22°18'-22°55'E, and is approximately 1050 m above sea level. The Park is characterised by human habitation; sedentary agriculturists practicing mixed farming system but living with wildlife. It is a generally flat grassland landscape, with seasonal floodplain where land is inundated from December to June. The floodplain is typified by grass species of Common Russet grass (Loudetia simplex) and Oats grass (Monocymbium ceresiiforme). Drier areas also develop termite mounds, forming wooded islands. Floodplain fringes have Zambesi Redwood (Baikiaea plurijuga) and Burkea (Burkea africana) dominated woodlands (van Gils, 1988; ZAWA, 2009) .
Liuwa plain has a high biological diversity of conservation importance. According to Leonard (2005) (Estes & East, 2009 ). The plain is drained by two large rivers, Luambimba and Luanginga, dominated by Syzygium spp.
Liuwa plain was managed by King Litunga Lubosi
Lewanika of the Lozi people as a hunting reserve until its establishment as National Park in 1972 (ZAWA, 2009). Management was through representatives of traditional leadership, the area chiefs and traditional advisors, indunas, responsible to the King Litunga. Upon establishment of the Park, management of natural resources was transferred to the government, by legal statute, and ZAWA was mandated to manage the Park. Local communities contested the ownership of the Park and its resources, some conspired with Angolan renegades from the neighbouring civil war, who were well equipped with firearms, to plunder the natural resources of Park. This situation went on for several years. As a consequence of this and inadequate resource protection, poor management and tourism infrastructure, and limited benefits to local communities residing in the Park, the government began to explore new partnerships towards more effective management.
METHODS
The study was motivated by information gaps in the underlying collaborative governance processes of many partnerships for benefit sharing schemes in Africa. We employed a literature review and expert knowledge coupled with focused interviews with 57 randomly selected informants. The authors have worked extensively in the wildlife sector of Zambia and have amassed technical knowledge in protected area management for over two decades. The informants were drawn from public sector organisations, private sector lead organisations, NGOs and local communities. An interview guide was used to generate historical perspectives of LPNP for the period between 2004 and 2011 (Annex 1). A case study approach, as described by Noor (2008) , was used to develop a detailed account of the situation. Qualitative field research methods were used to establish the relationships between concepts and themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) relating to social capital, events and mechanisms in collaborative governance and benefit sharing in the partnership. Protocols suggested by Bradburn et al. (2004) were used to guide interviews with knowledgeable people about LPNP. The scope of the case study was limited to partnership events and mechanisms, power relations and socio-economic-ecological performance.
THE PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS UNDERLYING BENEFIT SHARING IN LIUWA PLAIN NATIONAL PARK
In Zambia, partnerships for protected area management can be traced back to the mid-1980s (Dalal-Clayton & Child, 2003) and were aimed at addressing the poaching crisis during a time of limited state funding. Partnerships were based on emerging decentralisation policies for rural development and poverty reduction (Suich et al., 2009) . They usually involved the government, philanthropic partners with interest in biodiversity conservation and local communities co-existing with natural resources. Partnerships were legitimised by legal instruments (e.g. Agreements or Memoranda of Understanding), running for varied periods, ranging from one to 20 years. Documentation on partnerships in protected areas was, however, limited compared to those in transport infrastructure and agricultural sectors.
The PPP in LPNP was characterised by five discrete but interlinked constituencies: LPNP as a part of the Upper Zambezi social-ecological system; the ZAWA as LPNP management agency; Strichting African Parks Foundation (SAPF) as a private partner; Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) representing local communities in the Park; and a Partnership Board which governed the partnership on a company basis ( Figure 1) . The socialecological system of LPNP was characterised by high value common property resources such as migratory blue wildebeests, locally utilised through tourism and licensed hunting.
There are about 20,000 inhabitants in 432 villages in LPNP (Apse & Seybert, 2010) , who were originally sanctioned by King Litunga to keep game animals. In 1972 when the hunting reserve was established as LPNP, the government allowed human settlements to continue as the local communities were previously entrusted by their traditional leadership to manage natural resource. However, as noted above in the period following the establishment of the Park, natural resources were depleted due to poorly funded operations and disenfranchised local communities. In May 2004, the PPP was established between ZAWA, SAPF and BRE through a Management Agreement (relationship 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 1 ) to help resolve these problems. The existence of local communities in the Park who were managing wildlife prior to establishment of the Park was the basis for co-management and shared governance over the Park resources. BRE, working though the traditional chiefs and indunas, liaise with local communities on their inspirations and challenges and worked in turn with ZAWA and SAPF, to collectively discuss and resolve issues. Issues of equity are dealt with in a transparent manner by disclosure during public and Board meetings. The chiefs and indunas are accountable to both King Litunga and local communities through regular feedback (e.g. through local meetings).
The 2004 Agreement aimed at providing financial, ecological and political sustainability for the Park governed by the Partnership Board. The main components of Agreement are given in Annex 2. Operational management function was relinquished to SAPF by the government. Three distinctive levels of
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interactions were identified for the entire partnership: at contractual level relating to the Agreement, decisionmaking level relating to consensus made inter-party and operational level relating to activities in the field.
Incentives were a central activity and the basis for collective action. ZAWA maintains the regulatory roles as the employer of the Park's law enforcement staff, supplier of animals to restock the Park (relationship 4) and provides relevant legislative interpretation to the Park management team. SAPF is responsible for upgrading wildlife tourism development, valorisation of natural resources, transferring of income generated to benefit local communities and facilitate preservation of cultural heritage (relationship 5). In terms of income generation, local communities manage four rice grinding mills and five community campsites. They retain camping fees, sell firewood to tourists, charge for traditional cultural performances at the campsites, weave and sell baskets made from raw materials obtained in the Park, catch fish in designated Park fish ponds free of charge and are allowed to hunt animals in the surrounding Upper West Zambezi Game Management Area on 'resident' licences issued by the government. The other main role for local communities is conducting resource protection and monitoring through village scouts, trained by SAPF. In order to secure funds, SAPF was mandated to raise substantial funding from cooperating partners and recruit technical personnel for park operations and tourism development. Further, SAPF was responsible for animal population growth, capital asset, wildlife translocations, resource economics and local leadership. Recognising the importance of garnering conservation support, BRE was involved at the policy making level, facilitating community projects and participating in conservation programmes (relationship 6). External support to the partnership and legitimisation of its operations were indirectly applied via SAPF. 
Partnership Board

PARTNERSHIP PROCESSES AND POWER RELATIONS
In the process of establishing the LPNP partnership, lessons learnt previously within Southern Africa (Fearnhead, 2009 ) on institutional experiences of partners on, for instance, partnership administrative structures and park management systems development resulted in a shorter 'learning curve'.
Negotiation processes for the partnership development lasted for more than one year. Political and traditional BRE leadership played a critical role in the establishment and maintenance of the partnership. However, the seemingly top down approach of the partnership establishment processes undermined ZAWA's participation. SAPF articulated, in substance and process, roles and responsibilities while other partners struggled with interpretation of the provisions of the partnership. More positively these matters were redressed through partnership communication channels, including regular quarterly Board meetings, though these efforts were protracted due to officialdom within ZAWA (Annex 2). Regardless of the challenges, high confidence by private donors in SAPF resulted in substantial startup and implementation funds. Early in the partnership process, the resources acquired were spent in offsetting high transaction costs of establishing and implementing the protected area management partnership, sensitising and training stakeholders, providing operational logistics and personnel placements.
Though initially parties conceded to the Board's decision making, unbalanced representation caused skewed power relations at contractual, decision making and even operational level. Uneven power relations and rights favoured SAPF, due to what turned out to be a poorly and inequitably negotiated partnership contract. ZAWA's decision making mostly prevailed at contractual level, hence ZAWA embarked on re-engaging partners to strengthen decision making provisions in the operational management of LPNP while enfranchising SAPF.
Some people also felt that partnership negotiations were not adequate. During the implementation of Agreement, partnership decision making was undertaken in quarterly meetings of the Board. Ground rules for implementation of the partnership included upholding by all parties decisions agreed during the meetings, openness of each party to the other, the agreement of definitive channels of communication and pursuing amicable means to resolve any developing conflict. Despite the initial problems, a planned independent performance evaluation in the first five years of the PPP gave a positive assessment of partnership credibility (Apse & Seybert, 2010) .
The partnership operates at a strategic business unit, where funds raised from park fees, tourism and private donations are retained for conservation and rural development, with the aim that operations became cost neutral or profit making. Local communities retained revenues from various income generating activities and community projects noted above. Financial benefits' sharing on company profits is based on partner shareholding with 70 per cent going to SAPF and 30 per cent to BRE. No revenues generated in the Park were shared with ZAWA, although they have expressed a wish to be included as a shareholder in the partnership.
The partnership adopted an adaptive management approach. Through innovations and competition, the management team was able to learn from other parks within Zambia and the region on how they were managing for instance park law enforcement, tourism development, infrastructure development and community relations. This type of cooperative learning allowed the testing of various approaches and allowed the management team to adapt operations to meet specific circumstances. For example, with an increased emphasis on discipline, provision of incentives and a targeted patrol system, the management team of LPNP were able to effectively manage environmental crimes in the Park. At an operational level, marketing and planning, whose outputs included business and land use plans, were core elements in guiding management decisions. The capture of benefits by elites was avoided by widespread local participation instead of targeting interventions to a few selected influential individuals. The main checks and balances put in place for avoidance of capture of benefits by elites were openness and transparency with local communities, through notifying BRE on benefit distribution.
ECOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE
As noted, prior to partnership establishment, large mammal populations were overhunted in LPNP by Angolan armed factional forces and fugitive refugees. The partnership restored the fragile ecosystem and ecosystem processes that threatened the traditional cultural and ecological integrity of LPNP. (Mwima, 2007) . As a result of partnership conservation efforts, tourist arrivals in LPNP increased and averaged at 440 tourists per annum from 291 tourists in 2003 (Apse & Seybert, 2010) . Further, establishment of Transfrontier Conservation Area between Mussuma Area in Angola and LPNP in Zambia is currently underway.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Local communities in LPNP received several financial and non-financial benefits resulting from the LPNP partnership between 2004-2011. The transfer of benefits for rural development was linked to wildlife conservation; as a result project development by local communities is increasingly supporting Park sustainability. The benefits inter alia include: annual jobs increased by 733 per cent from 12 jobs in 2004 to 100 jobs by 2011 for local people in 'low volume, high value' tourism development. A total of 37 pupils received school scholarships. At Lukoko School, one block of two classrooms and two teachers' houses were constructed. Six campsite attendants' houses were built. A reforestation programme in settled areas included the supply and planting of 700 fruit and indigenous trees (plus 82 watering cans), 500 of which were planted on the school grounds of 18 local schools. Kalabo High School computer room and V-Sat internet facility were constructed, and thirty computers donated. Twenty-six boreholes were sunk for domestic water supply to 26 villages and schools. Three water wells were dug at the three community campsite at Lyangu, Kwale and Katoyana. Four hundred solar cookers were distributed for local communities' use, to help address the unsustainable harvesting of fuel wood. In addition, 79 energy saving stoves were supplied to local community members for use. Four rice grinding mills were distributed for use by local communities. Eleven women's clubs were registered, and were financially and technically supported in skills and product development. LPNP inter-schools drama festivals, community training in conservation and the Liuwa Environmental Education Programme (LEEP) involving 5,000 school children were facilitated and all focused on a strong outreach component. Core conservation values such as traditional fishing and animal grazing grounds were protected, and the historical Libonda Kuomboka and Liyenya annual traditional ceremonies were promoted through provision of financial benefit transfers.
These projects were funded from revenues generated from enterprises such as tourism community campsites and from donor funds. Over the years substantial funding has come from donors, and funds generated from other revenue streams in LPNP are steadily increasing. The management team administer the funds through Liuwa Community Development Fund (Annex 2). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The collaborative governance of LPNP in form of a tripartite partnership of ZAWA, SAPF and BRE has contributed to the positive performance of Park management. The period assessed (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) is relatively short but it provides an indication of the impact of such a partnership when collaborative governance is integrated with benefit sharing mechanisms. The LPNP partnership is dynamic but could have probably achieved more if the design was better negotiated by government and BRE. Even though the partnership negotiations lasted over a year, allowing for lengthy but effective negotiations can maximise ownership by stakeholders and minimise future bottlenecks in the progression of a partnership (Roe et al., 2001) .
As the partnership formed a nexus of conservation and rural development, it drew participation from many different stakeholders, whose successful benefit depended on the strength of fair collective bargaining of their interests. Due to the failure by ZAWA and BRE to comprehensively bargain at the beginning of the partnership, however cooperative trust reduced over the years. According to Glasbergen (1995) , effective performance of protected area management and benefit equitable sharing is linked to levels of trust between partners. Hence, the need to constantly discuss and resolve emerging issues through mechanisms such as the Partnership Board and stakeholder meetings. Nevertheless, the SAPF demonstrated its capacity to raise funds from cooperating partners and generate revenues from LPNP. However, since much of the funding utilised for Park management and community projects remains largely donor contributions, sustainable financing plans will need to emphasis further generation of revenues from local LPNP partnership processes.
Since the establishment of the partnership, benefits have been generated and transferred to stakeholders. The Park's profile has improved but stakeholder expectations still remain very high based on the promises made in respect to enhancing biodiversity, infrastructure, tourism and community development at the beginning of the partnership. However, in order to generate substantial profits further enhancement of the resource base, tourism and management infrastructure, community relations and community livelihoods is recommended. This agenda will require parties to further fine tune their responsibilities and accountability. In particular, ZAWA and BRE will need to be robust enough as 'institutions of sustainability' to be able to fairly and firmly negotiate, and counteract external influences.
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ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE ON COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND BENEFIT SHARING IN LIUWA PLAIN NATIONAL PARK FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2004 AND 2011
A: Preliminaries 1. Disclosure of the purpose and contents of the interview 2.
Confirmation of the participants' historical knowledge of the Park 3.
Obtaining participants' consent 4.
Assuring participants of confidentiality of their input 5.
Personal details and affiliations Find out how partners related to each other vis-àvis the partnership Agreement.
6.
Establish what were the benefits of the partnership and how they were generated and, subsequently, how they were shared among the parties. 7.
What were the roles and responsibilities of each party and how were they implemented? 8. Obtain the description of ecological and socioeconomic performance attributed to the partnership. N.B.: Probe further on each of the above issues depending on the willingness of the participant to be interviewed more, where necessary. 

The Agreement's jurisdiction is over the Park and does not include areas surrounding it. In practice, however, the partnership operations have spilled over to the surrounding areas especially in the area of community projects such as social amenities and human wildlife conflict mitigation.
The Agreement advocates regular communication among stakeholders, ZAWA, SAPF and BRE, mainly in writing. In practice, besides sharing written operational reports, presentations are also made when necessary and agreed by the partners. For instance, BRE representatives locally known as Silalo Induna Committee report to their constituencies (area committees) and the Board on various community issues and projects, and so do field team of SAPF and ZAWA on park operations. At times, however, internal communication and officialdom among some members of parties have been challenging.
The Agreement provides for establishment of a BRE Cultural and Support Fund for support of BRE cultural and administrative activities and Liuwa Community Development Funds (LCDF) to speedily support anti-poaching and community projects. Management team administers both funds. Further, penalties in form of deductions from LCDF are implemented on monthly basis in accordance with the Agreement when poaching incidents or other unlawful activities by the local communities occur in the Park. These measures are supported by the local communities and prove to be effective in curbing biodiversity loss in LPNP.
The Agreement devolves management authority to a management team but also further gives the rights such as granting of tourism concessions to SAPF. In practice, based on the Agreement, ZAWA is consulted and approves policy decisions such as granting of tourism concession prior to implementation. 
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RÉSUMÉ
Plusieurs modèles de partenariats public-privé ont fait leur apparition, axés sur : la création de richesses à partir de ressources à forte valeur ajoutée, la répartition des risques grâce au partage des avantages et des coûts, et la prévention de la perte de la diversité biologique. Ces partenariats ont été possibles grâce à une collaboration entre membres du secteur public et privé et les communautés locales. Cependant, peu d'informations sont disponibles quant à leur performance socio-écologique. Une étude de cas a été réalisée entre 2004 et 2011 dans le parc national de Liuwa Plain (3 660 km 2 ), en Zambie occidentale, afin de démontrer la relation entre le capital social et la gestion opérationnelle par des partenaires multiples. Cette étude s'est basée sur un examen des études publiées, les connaissances d'experts ainsi que des entretiens menés auprès de 57 répondants, en s'appuyant sur une perspective historique de la zone concernée. Nous avons ainsi pu déterminer que les gains et la répartition des avantages en termes socio-économiquesécologiques étaient déterminés par la capacité des partenaires à négocier des intérêts collectifs. Par ailleurs, la mise en réseau au sein et à l'extérieur du partenariat, l'apprentissage social et les capacités différentielles s'avèrent être également des facteurs importants.
